South Carolina Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 5

Article 3

1966

Transmutation of Community Property
Norvie L. Lay
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Norvie L. Lay, Transmutation of Community Property, 18 S. C. L. Rev. 755 (1966).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Lay: Transmutation of Community Property

TRANSMUTATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY:
NoRviE L. LAyt

More and more attorneys in common law jurisdictions are being
called upon to counsel clients, who were at one time domiciled
in a community property state, concerning their interests in
property that were acquired while residing in the community
state or that have subsequently been received. The necessity for
a determination of the exact property interest of the client may
occur as a result of a divorce, property settlement or the need for
an estate plan. It is in the realm of estate planning, however, that
the attorney may be of inestimable value to his clients, who
chance to be husband and wife, due to the fact that both of them
are desirous of having a workable plan that will insure compliance with their dispositive schemes, while at the same time,
minimizing the potential tax liability. He will have greater flexibility here than in the aforementioned situations. The parties
are amicable, and the attorney has an opportunity to view the
total picture and to take any remedial measures prior to the time
when a judicial body might be asked to intervene.
Realizing that community property is a stranger to the common law, the attorney may fear, as well he should, that the
courts in the common law jurisdiction might not treat the property as community. On the contrary, they might tend to rationalize toward some analogous form of common law ownership
such as a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. Fully appreciating that the court's characterization could drastically affect the
ability of the spouses to make the desired testamentary disposition in a particular fashion, as well as altering the tax liability,
he may not be willing to leave this to chance. It may be preferable to have title to this property held in a form of ownership with which the courts in the common law states are familiar.
In fact, he may find it necessary, or at least desirable, to alter
in some manner the respective interests which each spouse
possesses in the property transported from the community property state. Before attempting such an alteration, he should check
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to determine whether the state which characterized the property
as community, and from which the parties moved, will permit
the severance of the community aspects of the property, and
if it does, under what circumstances, and with what formalities
such severance will be allowed.
After ascertaining the possibility of a severance or partition
if the property had remained in the community state, the attorney should then consider whether the change of domicile to a
common law jurisdiction affected the parties' right to modify the
community aspects. These problems are immediately posed:
May the spouses sever their interests in the property although
it was forbidden by the community state? If a partition was
permitted by the community property state, should the method
of effecting this change be governed by the law of the community state in which the property was acquired, or by the law of
the common law state in which the parties now reside? Is there
any advantage to be derived from complying with the laws of
both jurisdictions if this is possible?
I. C0313YUNITY PROPERTY JURISDICTIONS

A. Arizona
The question of whether the spouses may change the character
of the property acquired by them after their marriage first arose
in Arizona in connection with the conveyance of some real estate
from a husband to his wife. The instrument of title recited
that it was conveyed in consideration of love and affection. 1
The transfer was subsequently attacked on the theory that it was
ineffectual to pass title, inasmuch as a conveyance of community
realty was, by statute, invalid without the signatures of both
spouses on the deed as grantors. The court found the purpose
of this requirement to be for the protection of the wife should
the husband attempt to convey the property to a third person.
It was not designed to interpose obstacles in the path of a conveyance directly to the wife. To require the wife's signature on a
conveyance to herself would be a senseless and useless act. Hence,
the husband's signature was sufficient to vest the property in the
wife as a part of her separate estate, thereby severing the community aspects of the reality.
The court continued to voice its approval of such transfers of
community property from a husband to his wife on the basis that
1. Luhrs v. Hancock, 6 Ariz. 340, 57 Pac. 605 (1899).
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they were completed gifts,2 but when confronted with a conveyance of the wife's interest to her husband, it was first held ineffective due to the absence of the husband's name on the deed
as one of the grantors. 3 On rehearing, 4 the logic of the decision
was reconsidered, and it was held that if a deed from a husband
to his wife satisfied the requirement that both spouses join in
the conveyance, there was no sound reason why a deed from the
wife to the husband, executed in a like manner, did not comply
with the same requirement.
It was then argued that if the conveyance was valid, the most
that could be transferred would be the wife's one-half interest so
that the husband would continue to hold the other one-half as
community property. The court felt that any such analysis was a
legal impossibility because by definition both spouses are invested with an interest in the community property, and when the
wife conveyed her interest to her husband she had nothing left.
With the husband now the sole owner of the legal title, it could
no longer be a part of the community, and he would own it as a
portion of his separate estate.
Just as the community character of the property may be destroyed by a conveyance of the interest of one spouse to the
other,5 if property is purchased with community funds and title
is originally taken in the name of only one spouse, with the full
consent of the other and with the intention of making a gift,
the newly acquired property becomes the separate property of
the title holder, and the community funds will not be traced
through the transmutation. 6 However, the interests of neither
spouse in the community property will be severed or destroyed
by such a gift or conveyance if the rights of creditors would be
affected thereby.7 This is not really a restriction upon their
ability to sever. It merely prevents their doing so to the detriment of third parties. The rule would be the same if one of the
2. Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Bally, 19 Ariz. 580, 173 Pac. 1052 (1918);
Main v. Main, 7 Ariz. 149, 60 Pac. 888 (1900).
3. Schofield v. Gold, 25 Ariz 213, 215 Pac. 169 (1923).

4. Schofield v. Gold, 26 Ariz. 296, 225 Pac. 71 (1924).
5. In addition to those cases in notes 1-4, see Lincoln Fire Ins. Co. v. Barnes,

53 Ariz. 264, 88 P.2d 533 (1939) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 52 Ariz. 105, 79 P.2d
501 (1938); Colvin v. Fagg, 30 Ariz. 501, 249 Pac. 70 (1926).

6. Jones v. Rigdon, 32 Ariz. 286, 257 Pac. 639 (1927); Germania Fire

Ins. Co. v. Bally, 19 Ariz. 580, 173 Pac. 1052 (1918).
7. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 53 Ariz. 264, 88 P.2d 533 (1939).
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spouses attempted to convey his or her separate property in
fraud upon a creditor.
If the property involved is personalty instead of real estate,
one spouse can give his or her share to the other, or they may
divide it between themselves, without the formalities of any particular legal instrument. Therefore, where a husband and wife, in
contemplation of a separation, divided their household goods and
personal effects, the status of the property was changed from
community to the separate property of the recipient."
When a husband and wife can contract with each other concerning their respective interests in the community property,
and are allowed to hold property as joint tenants or as tenants
in common in addition to community, they may agree that property should be conveyed to them in one of these forms and not
as community property. 9 Since a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship is in derogation of the general principle that all
property acquired after the marriage is community property, it
must be clearly established that both spouses realize the significance of the manner in which the title is being taken. With the
community funds being frequently managed by the husband, it
would be possible for them to be used in the purchase of joint
tenancy property without the wife having any knowledge of this
change of status. The mere insertion of such language as "joint
tenants" in the conveyancing instrument may not be sufficient
to overcome the presumption in favor of the community. If a
provision were inserted in the document of title whereby the
spouses acknowledge that they intend to take the property as
"joint tenants with the right of survivorship," it will ordinarily
be given effect, and the property will no longer belong to the
community. 10
Once the property has been changed from community, the
participation of both spouses may be necessary to produce a reconversion to its former status. In Russo v. Russo," the husband
filed an action for a divorce and asked the court to partition
some real estate owned by the parties as joint tenants. While
the case was pending, the wife executed and delivered a quitclaim deed to this property to a third person who subsequently
8. Lightning Delivery Co. v. Matteson, 45 Ariz. 92, 39 P.2d 938 (1935).
9. Io re Baldwin's Estate, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 791 (1937). For the
statutory provision relating to joint tenancies and tenancies in common between
a husband and wife, see ARiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 33-431 (1956).
10. Collier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 242 P.2d 537 (1952).
11. 80 Ariz. 365, 298 P.2d 174 (1956).
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reconveyed it to her. The trial court held that this transaction
by the wife reconverted the property to community since it was
acquired during the marital relationship. A distribution was
ordered on this assumption. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, stating that when property is owned by the spouses as
joint tenants the respective interests of each are owned as his
or her separate property. Neither has the right to convey the
other's separate property. All the wife could transfer was her
one-half interest, and when the property was reconveyed to her
she received only what she had transferred. It was as if the
transaction had never occurred, and the property continued to
be owned by them as joint tenants without any reconversion to
community property.
Arizona has no statute specifically allowing or forbidding a
husband and wife from altering the status of their community
property; the only provision being that a married woman over
the age of twenty-one has the same right as a man to contract,
except that she cannot bind the common property of herself and
her husband.' 2 The net effect is to permit the spouses to contract with each other concerning their community interests in
any property so owned. They may alter their respective interests
in any fashion desired, provided they both realize the significance of the severance and are agreeable thereto. Another statute
gives legally married minors the same right and privilege to deal
with their community property.'"
Parties who are intending to marry are statutorily prohibited
from entering into an ante-nuptial contract, agreement or renunciation, the object of which is to alter or vary in any respect
the law of descent and distribution, either with regard to themselves or the children that either may have by some other person,
or with respect to their common children. 14 From this, it would
appear that if prospective marital partners agree before their
marriage that any property acquired subsequent to marriage
would be held by either spouse in any form other than community
property, and if it would have been community in the absence of
such an agreement, it would definitely affect the law of descent
as provided by statute, and would thus be void. 15 If the contract
does not alter the law of descent and distribution and is not
ARIz.

Rv. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (1956).
STAT. ANN. § 25-212 (1956).
14. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-201 (A) (1956).
12.

13. ARiz. REv.

15. In re Mackevich's Estate, 93 Ariz. 129, 379 P.2d 119 (1963).
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otherwise contrary to good morals and law, it is valid. 16 When
valid, it may not be altered after the marriage has been solemn17
ized.
B. Califom2ia
A husband and wife in California may enter into an agreement or transaction between themselves concerning the interests
which either of them possess in any property, just as if they were
not married. The only exceptions are the general rules which
regulate and control the actions of persons occupying confidential
relationships with each other.' 8 With this statutory authority,
they may convert their community property into separate property by contract,' or one spouse may make a gift of his or her
share to the other, thereby converting it into the separate property of the donee spouse.2 0 They may, likewise, convert their
separate property into community property by the same
methods. 2-"
The contract between the spouses whereby the community
character of the property is changed to the separate property of
either, or both, of the spouses becomes executed immediately upon
the agreement, with nothing remaining to be done by either
party.2 2 Since the contract is then fully executed, and is not

merely executory, the statute of frauds is not applicable, and the
spouses may alter the community character of real property, as
well as personalty, without the necessity of any formal instrument.23 A written document is not a prerequisite to its validity.
The alteration may be effected by an oral agreement if it can be
reasonably inferred from the conduct of the parties, together with
16. ARrz. RPv.

STAT.

ANN. § 25-201 (A) (1956).

17. Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-201 (D) (1956).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 158.
19. In re Sear's Estate, 182 Cal. App. 2d 526, 6 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960);
Dailman v. DalIman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 729, 339 P.2d 636 (1959); James v.
Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 328 P.2d 1023 (1958) ; It re Wieling's Estate,
37 Cal. 2d 106, 230 P.2d 808 (1951).
20. Johnson v. Johnson, 214 A.C.A. 29, 29 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1963) ; Odone v.
Marzocchi, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949); Hutchinson v. California

Trust Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 571, 111 P.2d 401 (1941).

21. Metcalf v. Metcalf, 209 Cal. App. 2d 742, 26 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1962);
In re Hartnett's Estate, 155 Cal. App. 2d 280, 318 P.2d 81 (1957) ; Woods v.

Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956).

22. It re Raphael's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 206 P.2d 391 (1949).
23. James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 328 P.2d 1023 (1958) ; Faust v.
Faust, 91 Cal. App. 2d 304, 204 P.2d 906 (1949); Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal.

134, 30 P.2d 398 (1934).
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all of the surrounding circumstances, that they intended a transmutation. 2 4 The only consideration that is required for such a
contract, whether in oral or written form, is the mutual consent of
25
the spouses.
Spouses in California may not only own property as separate
or community property but may hold it as joint tenants or as
tenants in common. 26 Therefore, an agreement between the
parties that any further acquisitions during their marriage will
be deemed to be held by them as joint tenants will effectively
alter the community aspects of such property. 27 In fact, the
agreement prevents the property from ever being labeled as community. From the date of the contract, each spouse owns a distinct and separate interest in the new accumulations and may
convey that interest as he or she would any other separate property.28 The community or joint tenancy property may also be
converted into property which they agree to hold as tenants in
29
common.
Unlike a conversion of the community to separate property,
if the property to be taken in joint tenancy form is real estate, the
contract must be in writing, for an oral agreement is not sufficient, under these circumstances, to destroy the community character. 30 With respect to personal property, the court first permitted a joint tenancy to be created orally, 31 but after the adoption of a statute providing that "a joint tenancy in personal
32
property may be created by a written transfer or agreement,11
33
the court held the language to be mandatory. Thus, a written
instrument or contract is essential to the creation of a joint
tenancy in either realty or personalty.
24. James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 328 P.2d 1023 (1958); Sandrini

v. Ambrossetti, 111 Cal. App. 2d 439, 244 P.2d 742 (1952); It re Raphael's
Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 206 P.2d 391 (1949) ; Long v. Long, 88 Cal. App.
2d 544, 199 P.2d 47 (1948).
25. Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956).
26. CAL. Civ. CODE § 161.

27. See also Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944) where
there was evidence that it was intended to remain as community though title
was taken as joint tenants; In re Gurnsey's Estate, 177 Cal. 211, 170 Pac. 402
(1918); Estate of Harris, 169 Cal. 725, 147 Pac. 967 (1915).
28. In re Kessler, 217 Cal. 32, 17 P.2d 116 (1932).
29. McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal. 2d 409, 101 P.2d 690 (1940); Wheeland
v. Rodgers, 20 Cal. 2d 218, 124 P.2d 816 (1942).
30. CAL. Civ. CODE § 683. See In re Harris' Estate, 9 Cal. 2d 649, 72 P.2d
873 (1937).
31. In. re Harris' Estate, 169 Cal. 725, 147 Pac. 967 (1915).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.
33. California Trust Co. v. Bennett, 33 Cal. 2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 (1949).
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A third method of altering the community interests is for the
parties to deposit funds in a bank account in both of their names,
and in such a form that the money is payable to either of them
during their joint lives and to the survivor upon the death of
either. The community character of any funds so deposited will
34
be lost, and the spouses will hold the account as joint tenants.
35
However, the bank account, together with any other property
held in joint tenancy, may be reconverted to community property
if the spouses should so desire.3 6 Also, if they had intended it
to be community from the beginning, and it had been placed in
some other form through mistake, no written agreement would be
necessary for its reconversion. 37 It had never actually been anything other than community.
While a husband and wife may orally contract with respect to
a conversion of their community into separate property, any
such contract entered into prior to the marriage must be in
writing. 38 The only necessary consideration is the mutual promise
to marry. 39 In Hussey v. Castle,40 the prospective spouses entered
into an oral contract whereby certain property was to belong to
the wife after the marriage, and in compliance therewith the
property was subsequently conveyed to her. After the transfer,
a creditor of the husband obtained a judgment against him and
sought to sell this property in satisfaction of the debt. The creditor alleged that the agreement between the spouses was invalid
as an ante-nuptial contract because it had not been reduced to
writing in conformity with the statutory requirement. The court
held that since the contract had been completely performed, it
was assailable by neither the husband nor wife, nor by a third
party. If both spouses, or if either of them, fulfills their part of
the contract it will be given effect although it was not originally
reduced to writing. 41 Otherwise, it will be invalid. The antenuptial contract may encompass all property owned by either
34.

CAL. FINANCIAL CODE §

852.

35. Hotle v. Miller, 51 Cal. 2d 541, 334 P2d 849 (1959).
36. Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal. 2d 131, 163 P.2d 443 (1945).
37. Ibid.
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 178.
39. Ayoob v. Ayoob, 74 Cal. App. 2d 236, 168 P.2d 462 (1946); In re
Wamnack's Estate, 137 Cal. App. 2d 112, 289 P.2d 871 (1955).

40. 41 Cal. 239 (1871).
41. Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657
(1956); It re Wablefeld's Estate, 105 Cal. App. 770, 288 Pac. 870 (1930);

Martin v. Pritchard, 52 Cal. App. 720, 199 Pac. 846 (1921).
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spouse at the time of the marriage and any, including wages, that
42
may be subsequently acquired.
With this ability to freely contract between themselves, there
would seem to be very little difficulty for a husband and wife
in California to alter the community aspects of their property at
anytime suitable to them, the important element being that they
intended the alteration or transmutation to occur. Without this
intention there would be no way of rebutting the presumption
that the property belongs to the community. Therefore, while the
parties may convert their community property into another form
of ownership by an oral agreement, it is certainly advisable to
43
use a written instrument in order to meet this burden of proof.
C. Idaho
By statutory enactment, either spouse in Idaho may execute
a conveyance to real property naming the other spouse as the
grantee, and the deed or other document of title need only be
acknowledged by the grantor spouse. 44 Such a conveyance raises
a presumption that the property is to be held thereafter by the
grantee spouse as a part of his or her separate estate, and if the
property previously belonged to the community, its former status
45
is lost by the transmutation.
The rule with respect to gifts of community property between
the spouses is that since they are able to contract with each other,
when either spouse is free from debt he or she may make a gift
of his or her interest in the community to the other. It thereupon becomes the separate property of the donee.4 6 When a gift
or conveyance of community property has thus been made while
there are outstanding debts owed by the donor or grantor, only
the creditors in existence at the time of the transaction may complain. A person giving credit afterwards may not attack the
gift's validity. 47 Even if there are outstanding debts, it will not
be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance if the donor spouse has
other property out of which the creditors may satisfy their legal
48
claims.
42. Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 293 P.2d 85 (1956).

43. For a discussion of the inherent dangers in the use of an oral agreement

and the necessity of being able to establish the true ownership interests, see
Erhman, Instant Community Property, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 259 (1965).
44. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (1963).
45. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (1963).
46. Hobbs v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 201, 304 P.2d 1034 (1949).
47. Glover v. Brown, 32 Idaho 426, 184 Pac. 649 (1919).
48. McMillan v. McMillan, 42 Idaho 270, 245 Pac. 98 (1926).
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Idaho permits any two persons to open a joint bank account
whereby the deposits may be made payable to either person or to
the survivor.49 In construing this statute, the court held that it
was designed primarily for the protection of the bank and was
not intended as a guide to determining the rights of the depositors
or the interests of any persons claiming under them.50 It does
not create a conclusive and irrebutable presumption that all of the
money in the account at the death of one depositor automatically
inures to the benefit of the survivor. On the contrary, the intention of the depositor to make a gift is determinative of any
survivorship interests. 51 If a gift of a joint interest coupled with
the right of survivorship was intended at the time of the creation
of the account, the survivor will be entitled to the balance upon
the death of the other depositor, but if no gift was intended there
52
will be no survivorship right by virtue of the death.
While all of the cases concerning joint bank accounts have dealt
with two persons other than husband and wife, 53 there is no
reason to suppose that a contrary result would have been reached
if spouses had been involved and the money deposited had been
community property. The statute does not forbid the creation of
a joint account by a husband and wife, and if the funds deposited
belonged to the community the same rule should govern as in
the case of any other gift from one spouse to the other. Hence,
if either intends for the other to have a right of survivorship in
this joint account at his or her death, the community funds will
be converted into the separate property of the survivor. Otherwise, they will retain their original community character.
A husband and wife in Idaho may thus convert their community property into the separate property of either by making
a gift of their own interest to the other, or by a written instrument of conveyance if real estate is being transferred. 54
49.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-1014 (1963).
50. In re Chase's Estate, 82 Idaho 1, 348 P.2d 473 (1960).
51. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Caldwell, 81 Idaho 285,

340 P.2d 1094 (1959).

52. Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650 (1956).
53. It re Chase's Estate, 82 Idaho 1, 348 P.2d 473 (1960) ; Idaho First Nat'l
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Caldwell, 81 Idaho 238, 340 P.2d 1094 (1959);
Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650 (1956).
54. Even when a gift has been made, the spouses have made use of a written
instrument and there is no indication in any of the cases as to whether a gift
of community personal property could be made by an oral agreement. If the
property had a high value, it would certainly be advisable to reduce the terms
of the gift to writing in order to prove that there was a completed gift if this
should later become necessary.
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Persons contemplating marriage in Louisiana may, by a contract executed before a notary and two witnesses, 5 5 modify or
limit the applicability of the community property system of that
state with respect to any property that they may bring into the
marriage, or subsequently acquire. They may even agree that
the community of acquests and gains shall never exist between
them.56 By this ante-nuptial contract the parties are, in effecu,
voluntarily severing their community interests in any future
acquisitions since the agreement will determine what property
belongs to the community and what belongs to the separate estate
of each spouse as it is accumulated. 57 By their joint action, the
prospective spouses may alter the terms of the contract at any
time prior to the celebration of the marriage, but after the exchange of vows it may not be changed in any respect. 58 Although
the parties have this freedom to vary the community system, one
writer has suggested that as a practical matter the ante-nuptial
contract has long been obsolete, and "the devise may be presumed
to be used today only by a few mature persons of means who are
contemplating marriage and wish to contract away the community
regime." 59
Once the parties have married without the benefit of an antenuptial agreement, they may not thereafter cause a voluntary
severance or dissolution of the community property, 60 with the
one exception that spouses who have been married elsewhere may
make a valid marriage contract within one year after their change
61
of domicile to Louisiana.
2
This inability is vividly illustrated in Driscoll v. Pierce

where the wife brought an action against her husband asking that
her separate property be returned to her. After receiving judgment, she executed a written document wherein she renounced her
interest in any community property owned by her husband. Fol55. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. § 2328.
56. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. § 2332.
57. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 2332, 2392, 2399, 2424.
58. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. § 2329.

59. Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3,

11 (1959).
60. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. § 2329: Nides v. Hoyle, 236 La. 1032, 109 So. 2d
908 (1959) ; Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956) ;
Sheard v. Green, 219 La. 199, 52 So. 2d 714 (1951) ; Driscoll v. Pierce, 115
La. 156, 38 So. 949 (1905).
61. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. § 2329.
62. 115 La. 156, 38 So. 949 (1905).
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lowing the death of her husband, she brought another action seeking to set aside the previous decree and renunciation on the
theory that the first judicial proceedings were in reality nothing
more than a voluntary separation of property and, as such, incapable of producing any legal effect upon her right to a portion of the community property. Even though the interim between the two actions exceeded six years, the court held that the
spouses were absolutely prohibited from severing the community
aspects of their property. Any consensual dissolution of the community even when accompanied by a judgment and a written
renunciation is invalid.
In a case where the spouses were living apart, the wife executed
an affidavit wherein she renounced all interests in the community property, but when the husband obtained a divorce, the decree
made no mention of a distribution of the community property
nor of their previous agreement.6 3 Some time after the divorce
had been granted, the wife sought to have the community partitioned. The court so ordered holding that "a contract of this
nature between husband and wife is absolutely void when entered
into prior to a judicial separation or divorce.""4 Again, a partition was ordered although a court decree had previously been
rendered.
Notwithstanding this total inability of the spouses to voluntarily sever their community property, either one is statutorily permitted to make a gift to the other6 5 with the limitation that they
can not make "any mutual or reciprocal donation by one and the
same act."6' 6 In applying this statute to a gift of community
property from the husband to the wife, the court held that the
community character was destroyed, and the property became a
part of the separate estate of the donee wife.6 7 The court felt
that there was no reason why such a gift would not be valid
because the wife is the only one entitled to prevent the husband
from making a gift of community property, 63 and when she
gives her consent the donation is valid.6 9 The court later held
that either spouse may give his or her interest in the community
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Nides v. Hoyle, 236 La. 1032, 109 So. 2d 908 (1959).
Id. at 1037, 109 So. 2d at 910.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1746.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1751.

Succession of Bendel, 116 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 1959).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. § 2404.

69. Succession of Williams, 171 La. 151, 129 So. 801 (1930); Succession of
Byrnes, 206 La. 1026, 20 So. 2d 301 (1944).
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property to the other7" whether that interest be in personality
72
or reality.
Therefore, the only methods by which a husband and wife in
Louisiana may alter or sever their interests and rights in their
community property is a voluntary partition or severance through
the medium of an ante-nuptial contract, or by gift if they marry
without such a contract.

E. Nevada
By reason of a statutory enactment, a husband and wife in
Nevada may enter into any contract or transaction with each
other which either might have entered into if unmarried.7 3 This
includes the right to alter legal relations in any property possessed by them.7 4 With this contractual ability, the spouses may
sever the community aspects of their property thereby converting
it into the separate property of either spouse, but such a dissolution must be supported by evidence of a clear and convincing
character that a transmutation was intended.7 5 While the statutes
do not specify any particular style of contract necessary to effect
a conversion, a conveyance of real property between the spouses
would presumptively have to be in writing because of the statute
of frauds.7 6 Even then, the deed creates only a presumption that
a transmutation was desired. This may be rebutted by evidence
77
to the contrary.
Since the spouses may hold property as joint tenants or as
tenants in common, they should be able to contractually convert
the property held by them as community into one or the other
of these forms. 78 Furthermore, if they own property as joint
tenants, it may be converted to community in the same manner.70
The parties may likewise sever the community character of
their property by making a gift, and the donee spouse receives it
70. Succession of Johnson, 8 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 1942).
71. Coney v. Coney, 220 La. 473, 56 So. 2d 841 (1951).
72. Ponthier v. Bordelon, 66 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 1953).
73. NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.070 (1957).
74. NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.080 (1) (1957).
75. Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945).
76. NEv. ZEv. STAT. § 111.05 (1957).

77. Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945).
78. NE v. REv. STAT. § 123.030 (1957).
79. Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 15, 278 P.2d 876 (1955).
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as a part of his or her separate estate.80 Inasmuch as the presumption prevails that all property accummulated after marriage
belongs to the community, the party claiming the property as
separate must present facts from which it may be deduced that a
severance or transmutation was intended.8 ' Mere naked statements by the spouses that a gift was desired will not suffice.8 2
However, a written declaration is not necessary because a gift
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties together with
the donee's transactions concerning the property after its
receipt.8 3
F. New Mexico
Like California and Nevada, New Mexico adopted statutes permitting spouses to contract with each other" and to alter their
legal relations concerning property owned by them. 8 When the
court was first presented with an opportunity to interpret these
additional grants of power, it held that the ability to contract
did not enable the spouses to agree to a transmutation of their
community property. 0 The court admitted that the statutes were
patterned after those enacted in California where the parties
could freely contract with respect to their property interests,
but it did not think that it was bound by the construction placed
upon the statutes by the courts of California when to do so
would render them inconsistent with other laws intended to be
retained.
Then in Chavez v. Chavez,8 7 the spouses purchased some real
estate, paying most of the purchase price with money accumulated after their marriage. Title was taken as joint tenants, as
was permitted by statute.88 The court expressly overruled their
80. Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945); Stockgrowers &
Ranchers Bank v. Milisich, 52 Nev. 178, 283 Pac. 913 (1930); Bailey v. Littell,
24 Nev. 294, 53 Pac. 308 (1898).
81. Laws v. Ross, 44 Nev. 405, 194 Pac. 465 (1921).
82. Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166, 228 Pac. 307 (1924).
83. Stockgrowers & Ranchers Bank v. Milisich, 52 Nev. 178, 283 Pac. 913
(1930).
84. N. M. STAT. ANx. § 57-2-6 (1953).
85. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 57-2-12 (1953).
86. McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78 (1938). For an article
on this case and its effect, see Clark, Tran.snutations in New Mexico Com-

munity Property Law, 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 273 (1952).

87. 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952).
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-2 (1953) permits a husband and wife to hold

property as joint tenants or as tenants in common as well as in community.
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previous opinion and held that there had been an effective transmutation of community funds into property held by the parties
in joint tenancy. Since this decision, the spouses may contract
with each other to voluntarily sever their community property
and may agree to convert it into another form of joint ownership
or into the separate property of either.
Although the spouses may agree to a severance, "any other
form of ownership through transmutation must be established by
clear, strong and convincing proof-more than a mere preponderance of evidence." 8 9 Apparently, this burden of proof
will be satisfied if either spouse can show that both parties
wanted a severance and that they contracted, or took title in another fashion, to effectuate this dissolution. The mere recitation
of one type of ownership in an instrument of conveyance will
not be sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the
90
community.
Either spouse may also execute a conveyance of community
realty directly to the other,91 or may make a gift of his or her
share of the community to the other marriage partner. 92 It then
becomes the separate property of the grantee or donee spouse
if this is the intention of the spouse making the transfer or gift.
G. Texas
Texas originally took the position that a husband and wife
could not voluntarily sever their community property by a mutual agreement that it should thereafter be the separate property
of either. 93 This continued to be the court's view until 1948 when
the Texas Constitution was amended so that a:
. . . husband and wife, without prejudice to pre-existing
creditors, may from time to time by written instrument as if
the wife were a feme sole partition between themselves in
severalty or into equal undivided interests all or any part
of their existing community property, or exchange between
themselves the community interest of one spouse in any
89. It re Trimble's Estate, 57 N.M. 51, 57, 253 P.2d 805, 808 (1953).
90. Ibid.
91. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-3 (1953).
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3-4, 57-3-5 wherein any property received after
marriage as a gift is the separate property of the recipient.
93. King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947); King v. Matney,

259 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535,

273 S.W. 799 (1925).
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property for the community interest of the other spouse in
other community property, whereupon the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall be and constitute a part
94
of the separate property of such spouse.
While this amendment was declared to be self operative, the
legislature was given the power to enact any laws relating to the
form and method by which these partitioning instruments could
be executed.95
Pursuant to this constitutional grant of authority, the Texas
Legislature enacted a statute providing that:
Such a partition or exchange shall be effectuated by a written instrument subscribed and acknowledged by both spouses
in the manner now required by law for the conveyance of
realty; whereupon the property or interest in property set
aside to each spouse by such instrument shall be and constitute a part of the separate estate of such spouses.
If such instrument purports to exchange property or to
partition property between husband and wife, otherwise
than as equal undivided interests in the same property, or as
equal shares or units of identical personal property, such
instrument shall not be valid unless approved by the Court
upon written application of the husband and wife, addressed
to the District Court of the county in which they or either
of them reside. Such petition must set out facts showing
that the transaction is not to the disadvantage of the wife,
and shall be filed and docketed as in other cases, and at any
time thereafter the District Court may, in term time, take
up and hear said petition and evidence in regard thereto,
and enter an order accordingly either approving or disapproving the transaction.9 6
In order for the partition to be effective against a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice or against any creditor, it
must be recorded with the county clerk of the county or counties
97
where the property is located.
Following this enactment, the parties were free to partition
their community property by complying with the statutory mandate, but any attempted deviation therefrom would render the
94.
95.
96.
97.

§ 15 (as amended 1948).
TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 15 (as amended 1948).
TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4624a (1948).
TEX. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4624a (1948).
TEX. CoNsr. art. 16,
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severance invalid.9 8 However, in Smith v. Ricks9 9 where the
husband had purchased United States Savings Bonds with community funds and had them made payable to himself or his
wife, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals held that the wife became
entitled to the bonds upon the death of her husband. The
opinion was based upon the regulations of the United States
Treasury which provided that if either owner of a co-owner
bond dies without surrendering it, the surviving co-owner will be
recognized as the sole and absolute owner. In affirming the
appellate court, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that "the solution as to the property rights of the surviving co-owner of 'or'
bonds rests in contract, and that contract becomes a part of the
bonds." 10 0 By so holding, the parties were allowed to alter the
characteristics of their community property without following
the statutory requirements for a partition, because if the Treasury regulations had not been given effect, the bonds would have
belonged to the community and not to the surviving spouse.
The survivorship problem arose again in Hilley v. Hutley' 01
where the husband, using community funds, bought some corporate stock and directed the broker to have it issued in the
name of the husband and wife as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship. Upon the death of the husband, the wife claimed
the stock by virtue of the survivorship clause, but the husband's
son by a former marriage objected, alleging that it was a part
of the community. In awarding judgment to the son, the court
held that the survivorship agreement was not effective as a partition of the community property used in the purchase because
it had not been subscribed and acknowledged by both spouses in
accordance with the statute relating to severances. Since both
spouses are prohibited from making a contract which would affect the legal order of descent,' 0 2 the stock could not be deemed
to have remained an asset of the community during their joint
lives, and it only became the separate property of the wife at
the death of her husband because this interpretation would
definitely affect the order of its descent and distribution. Neither
could the stock be treated as a gift from the husband to the
98. Stockwell v. Parr, 319 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Reed v.

Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
99. 308 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).

100. Ricks v. Smith, 159 Tex. 280, 283, 318 S.W.2d 439, 440 (1958).
101. 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
102. Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957) ; TEx. Civ.
STAT. ANN.

art. 4610 (Vernon 1948).
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wife for if she had predeceased him, the survivorship agreement
would have placed sole ownership in the husband. This would
be inconsistent with any idea of a completed and irrevocable gift.
This case did not destroy the ability of the spouses to partition
their community property, but reaffirmed the earlier position
that any severance must be accomplished in the manner prescribed by statute. In the opinion, however, the court specifically
overruled the Ricks case, relating to the survivorship rights in
United States Savings Bonds acquired in "or" form, on the
ground that "federal regulations do not overrule our local laws
in matters of purely private ownership where the interests of
the United States are not involved."'10 3
Prior to the Hilley case, the spouses in Free v. Bland'0 4 purchased United States Savings Bonds with community funds,
maling them payable to either the husband or wife. When the
wife died, the court of civil appeals held that ownership of and
title to the bonds was free from any claim of the wife's devisee.
The court stated that the Ricks case was controlling and that
the Treasury regulations were determinative. The Supreme
Court of Texas reviewed the case after it had handed down the
Hilley decision, and in a per curiam opinion, it reversed the
lower court because its pronouncement was now in conflict with
the rule announced in Hilley.10 5 Thus the survivorship provision
was nullified, and the wife's devisee was allowed to recover onehalf of the value of the bonds.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, 10 6
and when the case was heard it reversed the decision of the Texas

Supreme Court.' 07 In rebuttal to the argument that the Treasury
regulations were merely to provide a convenient method of payment, the Court held that their purpose was to confer the right of
ownership upon the survivor irrespective of local law. If a
state could frustrate any attempt of its citizens to take advantage
of the Treasury regulations by requiring the survivor to reimburse the estate of the deceased co-owner, it would be interfering directly with the power of the federal government to
borrow money under these conditions. Since a federal law must
prevail over a state law with which it is in conflict, any "state law
103. Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 577, 342 S.W.2d 565, 570 (1961).
104. 337 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
105. Free v. Bland, 162 Tex. 72, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961).
106. Free v. Bland, 368 U.S. 811 (1961).
107. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
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which prohibits a married couple from taking advantage of the
survivorship provisions of United States Savings Bonds merely
because the purchase price is paid out of community property
must fall under the Supremacy Clause."1 08
The Court agreed that the regulations could not be used as a
shield for fraud and that relief would be granted if the husband
exceeded his authority in investing in the bonds while acting in
capacity as the manager of the community property. Just what
the relief provisions would be under these circumstances the Court
refused to say, since no issue of fraud was presented in the case
that was before it.
In addition to the limitation placed upon the flilley case by
the Supreme Court's decision, the Texas Legislature subsequently
amended the Probate Code and "specifically provided that any
husband and wife may, by written agreement, create a joint
estate out of their community property, with rights of survivorship."' 1 9 Prior to the court's determination of the exact nature
of the changes wrought by the amendment, or the extent to which
it increased the ability of the spouses to partiti6n their community property, writers suggested various possibilities. One
approach was that it might be violative of the Texas Constitution 1 ° inasmuch as it permitted the spouses to create a new type
of property, and this was beyond the scope of legislative authority.-" On the other hand, it was suggested that the legislature
was doing nothing more than prescribing a method for severance
of the community interests in accordance with the 1948 constitu112
tional amendment.
The issue was resolved in 1965 in favor of the constitutionality
of the legislation. 1 3 The court held that the 1948 constitutional
amendment permitted a severance of community property under
certain circumstances by a written agreement, and it specifically
endowed the legislature with the authority to promulgate laws
108. Id. at 670.
109. TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. PROBATE CODE § 46 (1955)

Laws ch. 120, § 1, p. 233 (1961).

as amended by Texas

110. For some of the questions presented by the amendment together with a
discussion of its possible effect, see Wren, Recent Texas Statutes Affecting
Estate Planming, 15 Sw. L. J. 479, 484 (1961); Maxwell and Weathers,
Hailey, Hilley and House Bill 670-A Study in Partitionand Survivorship In
Texas Community Property, 15 Sw. LJ. 613 (1961).

111. Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
112. TEx. CoNs?. art. 16, § 15 (as amended 1948).

113. Williams v. McKnight, 391 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). This
case is noted at 19 Sw. L.J. 835 (1965).
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prescribing requirements as to the form and manner thereof.
The statute was the product of the exercise of this constitutional
grant of authority. The fact that it was not as complicated as
the previously adopted one' 1 4 was immaterial. It was designed
to alter and to simplify the procedure necessary for a transmutation.
A third encroachment upon Hilley came via the promulgation
of Another statute. In 1963, the Texas Legislature adopted a
statutory provision permitting the spouses to enter into a savings
contract involving a community property savings account." 5
By so doing, they can create a joint tenancy in such property
with the right of survivorship. This applies with equal force to
subsequent deposits and accrued dividends as well as to the
funds originally deposited. Because of the constitutional mandate requiring any severance to be by written instrument,"" the
savings contract must be in writing and subscribed to by each
spouse. It does not have to be acknowledged by either of them.
When these formalities are complied with, the statute states that
"such contract shall constitute a partition of such community
property or reciprocal gifts from the respective spouses.""1 7
As soon as the statute was adopted, arguments began to ring
either in favor of or against its constitutionality. The main contention advanced against its validity centered around the use of
the words "contract" and "gift." This is similar to that mentioned with regard to the earlier legislation, i.e., the new statute
would permit the wife to acquire separate property in a manner
not condoned by, or included in, the constitutional definition of
the wife's separate property." 8 However, the statute specifically
provides that such a contract creates a partition of the community property. Again, it appears to be a valid exercise of

legislative authority since the 1948 constitutional amendment
allows the legislature to specify the methods by which the partition may be effected." 0

Fourthly, the legislature recently enacted a statute which permits the spouses to own their automobile under a joint tenancy
114. TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4624a (1948).

115. TEx.

R.v.

Civ. STAT. art. 852(a), § 6.09 (Supp. 1964).

116. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 15 (as amended 1948).
117. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 852(a) § 6.09 (Supp. 1954).

118. TEX. CoNsT. art. 16, § 15 (as amended 1948).

119. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 15 (as amended 1948). For a discussion of the
relative merits of the statute together with the prime reason for its enactment,
see Recent Statutes, 43 TEx. L. REv. 596 (1965). See also Comment, 18 BAYLOR L

REV. 517 (1966).
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arrangement if the agreement is signed by both the husband and
wife. 120 Whatever the final outcome might be as regards the
scope of these last two statutes, the Hiley case, on its precise
facts, will not be affected since it dealt with the acquisition of
corporate stock. These two statutes were not designed to cover
this attempted method of severance. Nevertheless, its potential
scope has been severely restricted by the amendment to the Probate Code and the decision in Free 'v. BlZand.
Finally, the husband and wife may alter the community character of their property by making a gift of their interest therein
to the other, thereby converting it into the separate property of
12 1
the donee.
H. lVashington
Washington has enacted two statutes whereby a married couple
may cause a severance of their community property and thus
convert it into sepa-ate property. One permits a husband or
wife to give, grant, sell or convey, to the other, his or her interest
in all or any portion of their community real property. 122 Every
such conveyance operates to divest the property from any claim
or demand as community property and vests the same in the
grantee as his or her separate property. 123 When the statutory
requirements are complied with, a severance has been perfected
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the parties
were unaware of the significance of their acts and never intended
24
a transmutation to occur.'
The second statute allows the spouses to jointly enter into an
agreement to take effect at death, concerning the status or disposition of the community property owned by them at that time
or to be acquired thereafter. 125 This contract must be in writing,
witnessed and acknowledged in the manner required for conveyances of real estate, and may be altered or amended in the same
way. These contracts become executed upon the death of either
spouse, and the title to any community property contained
120. TEx. SEss. LAw SERv. ch. 658, § 24, at 1514 (1965).
121. Shroff v. Deaton, 220 S.W2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Cauble v.

Beaver-Electra Refining Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925); Amend v.

Johns,
122.
123.
124.
ghan's

184 S.W. 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
WASH. RFV. CODE § 26.16.050 (1951).

WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.050 (1951).
Bryant v. Stablein, 28 Wash. 2d 739, 184 P.2d 45 (1947); In re MoniEstate, 198 Wash. 253, 88 P.2d 403 (1939).

125. WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.120 (1951).
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therein vests in the survivor as a part of his or her separate
estate. 20 Since the parties have contracted that the property
shall belong to the survivor, neither of them may dispose of it
27
in contravention of the agreement.1
As noted, one of the statutes relates to an immediate severance
of community realty and the other pertains to a severance of
any community property to take effect at the death of either
spouse; but no statute exists whereby a present recharacterization
of community personalty into separate property can be accomplished by an agreement between the spouses. However, the
courts have upheld such agreements 12 8 and, unlike contracts relating to real property, they may be oral as well as written.1 29
This rule was altered to some extent in Holmorga v. Schalle?,130 where a creditor obtained a community judgment against
the spouses and sought to garnish the wife's wages in satisfaction
of the debt. The wife objected because she and her husband had
entered into a written agreement providing that the personal
earnings of the wife were to be her separate property and thus
not liable for any debts of the community. The court permitted
the garnishment stating that the validity of a severance contract
depended not only upon its existence, but a mutual observance
of the agreement by the parties was also essential. In this case,
there was an agreement but the community had always received
the benefit of the wife's earnings. Since this decision, both the
contract and the observance thereof are requisite to a transmutation of community personalty.
Another Washington statute provides that when United States
Savings Bonds are purchased in the name of two persons and
are not presented for payment before the death of either, the
surviving co-owner will become the sole and absolute owner of
them. 131 This is the same as the Treasury regulation in Free v.
Bland, 32 and since the Supreme Court's decision in that case,
126. I1; re Brown's Estate, 29 Wash. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).
127. In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wash. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).

128. Cf. Hill v. Cole, 132 Wash. 432, 231 Pac. 950 (1925); Churchill v.

Stephenson, 14 Wash. 620, 45 Pac. 28 (1896).
129. Gage v. Gage, 78 Wash. 262, 138 Pac. 886 (1914); Union Sec. Co. v.
Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 Pac. 304 (1916); In re Janssen's Estate, 56 Wash.
2d 150, 351 P.2d 510 (1960). See 33 WASH. L. REV. 112 (1958), citing Dobbins v. Dexter Horton & Co., 62 Wash. 423, 113 Pac. 1088 (1911).
130. 51 Wash. 2d 94, 316 P.2d 111 (1957). See 33 WAsH. L. REV. 112
(1958).

131. WASH. Rxv.

CoDE § 11.04.230 (1951).
132. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supmra.
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the statute adds nothing to the ability of the spouses to effect a
severance of their community property which they could not do
in the absence thereof. Nevertheless, this statute was the focal
point of a case where the husband bought such savings bonds with
community funds and made them payable to himself and his
brother.13 When the husband died, the brother claimed the
bonds and based his allegation upon this statute. The court held
that the husband's actions amounted to an unilateral attempt
to convert community property into separate property, and because this could be done only by an agreement of both spouses,
the bonds remained as a part of the community. Free v. Bland
was distinguished on the ground that the wife had there been
named as the co-owner while in the present case the husband's
brother was so named. The Free decision had also held that relief would be available if the husband committed a breach of
trust while acting as manager of the community property. The
Washington court felt that the husband had breached his
fiduciary duty by trying to place the bonds out of the reach of
his wife in violation of her rights in the community, and opined
that it was following the Free case. By the final decision, the
wife received the value of one-half the bonds, and the other onehalf passed under the husband's will. The brother received
nothing.
The case was subsequently heard by the United States Supreme
Court' 34 which agreed that the federal regulations governing
savings bonds could not be used as a device to deprive the wife
of her property rights which she enjoyed under the law of
Washington. On the other hand, if the husband's action did
not amount to fraud or a breach of trust tantamount to fraud,
the bonds would belong to the brother. The Court then reviewed
the Washington law whereby the status of community personalty
could be changed by one spouse making a gift of his or her interest to the other, or by an agreement to become effective upon
the death of either spouse. 13 Hence, if the wife had consented
to the purchase of these bonds as a gift to her husband's brother,
or if she agreed to their inclusion in that portion of the community estate over which the husband could testamentarily dis133. In re Yiatchos's Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962).
134. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
135. WAsr. REv. CODE §§ 26.16.050, -120 (1951). See also Scott v. Currie,
7 Wash. 2d 301, 109 P.2d 526 (1941) ; In re Hubbard's Estate, 115 Wash. 489,
197 Pac. 610 (1921); In re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204
(1915).
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pose of, or if she later ratified such purchase and registration,
her husband's conduct would not be sufficiently fraudulent to
vitiate the regulations. The brother would then be entitled to
the bonds. There was no evidence in the record as to the wife's
conduct, and the case was remanded for a determination of her
knowledge of and participation in the purchase of the bonds.
Even if she did not consent to nor later ratify the purchase,
the brother would still receive all of the bonds if, under Washington law, (a) the wife is entitled to one-half of the total value of
the community property and not one-half of each community
asset, and (b) there are other community assets out of which
her share may be satisfied. The reason for this is that she will not
really lose her property interests if she can be reimbursed for
her one-half interest used by her husband to purchase the bonds
in derogation of her rights in the community. This is a very
sound approach because it is giving effect to the federal regulations only to the extent that they do not enable the husband to
perpetrate a fraud upon the wife. To do otherwise would produce a definite injustice and would amount to a condonation of
fraudulent conduct. In fact, it might even encourage it.
If there are not enough other community assets out of which
she may be reimbursed, the bonds will be used for this purpose.
Presumably, this means that if there are no other community
assets, she will receive one-half of the bonds. If there is other
property from which she may be partially satisfied, it will be
used, and any deficit will be made up through the use of one-half
the value of the bonds. If on remand it is found that the wife
is entitled to a share of each community asset, she would receive one-half of the bonds and the brother would receive the
remainder. In any event, the brother will receive one-half. The
opinion of the Washington Supreme Court was reversed insofar
as it held that this one-half passed by the husband's will because
this would amount to a state prohibition against its citizens
utilizing the savings bonds survivorship clause to transmit
property at death. Whatever the findings on remand, 136 the
wife's rights in the community will not be destroyed involuntarily
for if she consented to the purchase her interests will be affected
by her own conduct and not by that of her husband. If she has
not consented, she will receive one-half of the bonds or the value
of one-half of them, this being dependent upon the character
136. At the date of writing, there is no further reported case concerning the

specific outcome of the litigation.
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of her one-half interest in the community property under state
law. This decision does not enlarge the husband's right to dispose of the community, nor does it increase his ability to unilateraly sever it since the Court looked to Washington law to
determine the circumstances under which either of these may be
done. The only way the wife could have lost all of her interest
in the bonds is through her own conduct and consent.
Lastly, in Washington, as in all the other community states,
the spouses may destroy the community aspects of their property
by making a gift of their interests to the other thereby convert13 7
ing it into the separate property of the recipient.
II.

CONVERSION OUTSIDE OF COMMUNITY STATE

Once the attorney in the common law state has ascertained
whether the spouses have a right to sever their community property in the state where it was acquired, he should then consider
the possibility that the interstate move may have had some effect
upon their ability to do so. ie should also ponder the distinction
between those situations where the spouses retain their domicile
in the community state but the transmutation occurs in a common law jurisdiction, and those where the domicile has actually
been changed to a common law state. Will a court be more prone
to set aside an attempted severance where the parties never give
up their community domicile?
A. Where the Community Domicile is Retained
An excellent example of an attempted severance by a husband
and wife who retained their domicile in the community property
state is King v. Bruce'3" where the spouses entered into an agreement to sever their community property while domiciled in
Texas. They wanted to divide it equally into the separate property of each spouse, but under the Texas law then in effect such
a partition would be held invalid. 3 9 The parties then went to
New York with the avowed purpose of partitioning this property.
The husband drew a check on a Texas bank account containing
$5,800 in community funds and opened an account in a New
York bank with the same money for the identical amount. ie
137. In re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204 (1915) ; In re Hubbard's Estate, 115 Wash. 489, 197 Pac. 610 (1921) ; Scott v. Currie, 7 Wash.

2d 301, 109 P.2d 526 (1941).

138. 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947). cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947).

139. Bruce v. Permian Royalty Co., 186 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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then drew a check on this account for $4,000, requesting that it
be paid in silver dollars to be equally divided into two containers.
He obtained two cashier's checks for $500 each, and drew two
other checks for $400 each. All of them were made payable jointly to himself and his wife. Each spouse endorsed one of the
cashier's checks along with one of the other joint checks, thus
making them payable to the other spouse. Following this elaborate maneuver, they entered into a contract in New York stipulating that each party was entitled to the two checks endorsed by
the other together with one of the containers of silver dollars,
and further stipulating that they intended for the severance to
be accomplished by the transfer between themselves and not on
the theory of mutual gifts. The contract recited that its purpose
was to secure one-half of the community property to the separate
estate of the wife, and expressed their desire to have the contract
governed by the law of New York, where it was executed and
performed.
After the contract was executed, each deposited his $2,900 in a
separate account in a New York bank under his own name and
received in return a cashier's check for this amount. They immediately returned to Texas where the wife opened an account in
a Texas bank by depositing her New York check. A community
creditor garnished this account and the wife objected, claiming
it as her separate property.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the New York
law governed because the validity of a transfer of personal
property is dependent upon the law of its actual situs at the time
of the conveyance. 140 Furthermore, the validity of the contract
itself should be determined by the law of the lex loci contractus.
By applying the law of New York, the contract was held to be
valid, and the parties were allowed to sever their community
property although it could not have been partitioned in Texas by
the same method. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, placing
special emphasis upon the obvious fact that the spouses had not
changed their domicile to New York but were citizens and
domiciliaries of Texas when the New York transactions occurred.
Their only purposes in going to New York had been to enable
the wife to enjoy in Texas the property segregated to her, and
to obtain in Texas the benefits incident to its ownership. Bearing
in mind that the parties retained their Texas domicile, the court
then held that the law of Texas remained applicable to the
140. 197 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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transactions. It was pointed out that this was not a renunciation
of the rule that the validity of contracts is ordinarily determined
by the place of execution and performance. Rather that rule
would "not be observed and applied when to enforce a foreign
contract, according to the provisions of the foreign laws, will
contravene some established rule of public policy of the state of
the forum."1 1 As between the spouses, the law of their domicile
prevailed.
There are several factors which may have directly influenced
the court's decision. First, the spouses never changed their
domicile. At all times they remained Texas domiciliaries. As
such, it could be reasonably said, as the court did, that the law of
that jurisdiction was still applicable to their personal relationship
and governed their contractual arrangements even though the
instrument was executed and performed elsewhere. This is
particularly true where the real benefit to be derived from the
performance of the contract was to be received by the spouses
after their return to Texas.
While this is sufficient justification for the application of
Texas law, fuel is added to the judicial fire by the second factor,
i.e., they went to New York solely for the purpose of circumventing the law of their domicile. If the court winked at this uncamouflaged tactic, any Texas residents who were dissatisfied
with legal inabilities imposed upon them by Texas law would
have a simple and uncomplicated solution. They could merely
remove themselves from the state long enough to accomplish the
desired result, and then return to enjoy the fruits of their labor.
If this were the law of Texas relating to conjugal relationships,
marital property rights would be reduced to a meaningless
set of unenforceable rules. They would be no more than rules
of convenience to be used to advantage by those who so desired
and evaded by those who disliked their application. This aspect
undoubtedly prompted the court to advance the public policy
argument in applying the law of the forum. As illusive as the
term "public policy" may be, it seems fitting here.
A third factor which may have influenced the court was that
the parties had previously attempted to sever this property in
Texas and it was only upon this unsuccessful endeavor that they
went elsewhere. This shows more strongly their avid desire to
evade the restrictions of Texas law. Their conduct could not be
141. 145 Tex. 647, 657, 201 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1947).
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considered to have been a product of their good faith nor of their
mere lack of knowledge of Texas law. From first hand experience, they knew that similar efforts in Texas were futile, and
they wanted to escape that handicap.
Fourthly, a community creditor was involved. To permit the
spouses to defeat his claim by this subterfuge again raises the
public policy issue. This is magnified by the fact that there
were outstanding community debts at the time of the New York
junket.
One cannot be certain whether the court would have reached
a different result if the parties had changed their domicile
to New York rather than simply having gone there with the
expressed intention of partitioning the community property.
However, the court mentioned this salient fact several times and
repeated that they were bearing it in mind while arriving at
their opinion. To have held otherwise in this particular factual
situation would have been a condonation of an overt attempt by
Texas citizens to subvert the laws of that state. Likewise, the
court may have upheld the validity of the contract if no third
party had been involved, or if the spouses had not been so patent
in their intentions. It is impossible to segregate any one of these
factors as the sole contributor to the court's decision, but together they all add up to a resounding application of the law
of the domicile.
The usual case of the migrant client will involve an actual
change of domicile to the common law state. However, the above
decision could still be very important if the client came to the
common law jurisdiction for a specified period of time with
the intention of returning to the community state or did, in fact,
subsequently return. It could then be legitimately argued that
there had never been a change of domicile. Vhile the intention to
live permanently at the new residence is not necessary to effect
a change of domicile, if a return to the community state is imminent, a new domicile might not be established. 142 The shorter
the length of time spent in the common law state, the more
plausible this possibility. 14 3 The likelihood of such a decision is
increased by the determination of the domicile according to the
law of the forum, which would probably be the community state
14 4
if the spouses do return.
142. For a discussion of the rules with respect to a change of domicile, see

GOODRIc H, CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 26-29 (3rd ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CoNmFIcrs

or LAWS § 10 (1959).

143. See GooDRcHIr, and LEFLAR, op. cit. supra note 142.
144. GooDRcIC, CoNFLICTs OF LAWS § 21 (3rd ed. 1949).
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In the recent New York case of Wyatt v. FuZrah,145 however,
an opposite result was reached. The spouses were both nationals
of Spain where they were married and where they were domiciled
during their entire lifetimes. Because of political unrest, large
sums of money and securities were sent to New York for safekeeping. In establishing accounts in various banks, the parties
either expressly agreed in writing that the New York law of
survivorship would apply or they agreed to a form of survivorship account that conformed to the law of New York. The contracts were apparently executed in Spain. According to the law
of New York, the wife, upon the death of her husband, would
have been entitled to the entire amount contained in these accounts by virtue of the survivorship agreement. Under the law
of Spain, this was community property and the spouses were
prohibited, except by an ante-nuptial contract, from entering into
any form of consensual arrangement which would enable the
survivor to receive all of this property.
Conceding that such a contract of survivorship would have
been invalid under the law of Spain, the court asserted that
New York does have the right to decide asa matter of public
policy whether it will apply its own rules to property located
there, and which is owned by non-domiciliaries who chose to
place it there for safekeeping. The state likewise has the power
to honor the formal agreements of the owners that New York
law should apply to the disposition of this property upon the
death of one of the parties. With regard to the property actually
placed within the state while both spouses were alive, the court
recognized that the parties had in essence solicited the application of the law of New York and honored their request, even
though a different result would have been reached if the law
of their domicile had been relied upon.
There seems to be little question as to the ability of New York
to reach such a decision inasmuch as it had jurisdiction over the
personalty together with the written agreements of the spouses
wherein they specifically consented to the survivorship arrangement. It is interesting, however, that the court failed to make any
special effort to characterize the particular problem as one of
contracts, marital property rights or succession. While the issuer
may not have been limited to any one of these characterizations
and while it may have encompassed all of them, nevertheless,
such an approach may have been exceedingly helpful in trying
145. 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637 (1965).
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to reach a desirable end. The court did not attempt to discover
or discuss any of the relevant criteria ordinarily associated with
the application of the law of either jurisdiction. No mention
was made of the justification which the domicile has in governing the personal property interests of its residents and the corresponding desire to treat all such individuals as equally as
possible irrespective of where this property is located. Furthermore, the court did not intimate what might be the effect of its
decision upon such desire for control and uniformity. In fact,
the court gave no detailed explanation of why the law of New
York should govern in this particular instance. It merely said
that as a matter of public policy the state had the right to apply
its own law and it was preferrable to do so where the parties had
asked for its application.
As a precedent, the court cited Hutchison v. Ross1'" wherein
the law of New York was held to be determinative of the validity
of a trust created under the laws of that state even though it
would have been invalid under the law of Quebec where the
parties were domiciled. It would seem that two very important
aspects of the previous case were absent here. In the earlier case
the trustee had legal title to the property whereas the banks in
Wyatt were bailees who possessed no indicia of ownership. There
is greater impetus for applying New York law where the holder
of the legal title is a trust company organized under and subject
to the law of New York. Secondly, the Hutkhison trust arrangements contained an expressed intention of having the trust governed by New York law, where as in Wyatt the spouses agreed to
the application of the law of New York only through the medium
of survivorship bank accounts. It might have been argued that
these survivorship agreements were intended more for the protection of the banks than to indicate the desire of the depositors
to have their interests determined by the law of New York.
While admitting that the two cases were not identical, the court
thought the prior one suggested a direction to the present public
policy of the state.
Chief Judge Desmond, dissenting in Wyatt, felt that the majority was upsetting the uniform conflicts rules without any
good reason. The resolution of the dispute by any law other than
that of Spain was utterly incompatible with historic and settled
conflict of laws principles. In his view, the law of the matrimonial domicile should have been determinative.
146. Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933).
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Another part of the case should be mentioned. The spouses
had also deposited certain assets in England, but they were transferred to New York by the wife after the husband's death. The
court refused to apply its own law to these assets, but held that
the question should be determined by the law of the jurisdiction
where the money was deposited while both parties were alive.
If the law of that country would treat the property as having
passed to the wife at the time of her husband's death, New York
would do likewise. On the other hand, if England would have
applied the Spanish law of community property, or if it was
uncertain how England would rule, New York would apply the
law of Spain. While New York law would not determine the
method of disposition of this property, the court handled it by the
same method used with regard to the property originally deposited in that state.
A comparison of the New York and the Texas cases reveals
some factual differences that could have contributed to the
different results. First is the location of the property. If the
assets had been returned to Spain there seems to be relatively
little doubt as to the manner of resolution. Undoubtedly, the
law of Spain would have been applied and the same reasons assigned by Texas would also be applicable here, i.e., to permit the
parties to engage in such activities would enable them to avail
themselves of the law of their domicile -when desirable and to
go elsewhere when their interests would be furthered by this
tactic. A second difference is that the evidence of a willful intention to evade the law of the domicile was more substantial in
the Texas case. There the spouses went to New York with the
avowed purpose of contractually severing the community aspects
of their property while realizing that such a transmutation was
prohibited by the law of Texas. In the Wyatt case the spouses
originally sent the property to New York for safekeeping, not to
evade the law of Spain. This was apparently their primary goal
at the time of its introduction into that state. Thirdly, a creditor
was involved in the Texas case. True, there were third parties
in Wyatt who would be deprived of various interests because of
the decision, but they were prospective heirs and had not extended credit in reliance upon a particular form of property
ownership. These differences may be significant or may be no
more than mere rationalizations. Perhaps the real distinction
lies in who was asked to decide the question since both courts
gave lip service to public policy in applying the law of the
forum.
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While Wyatt may be subject to criticism, 14 7 it is very important from the standpoint of permitting the spouses to voluntarily alter their interests in community property even though
such a transmutation is prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction
where the property was acquired. This is particularly true when
a new domicile is also established in the common law state.
In other cases where the place of contracting and the domicile
of the spouses have been different, the courts have generally
resolved the question of the ability of a married woman to
contract, or the ability of the spouses to contract between themselves, by looking to the law of their domicile. The United States
Supreme Court has sanctioned this determination,1 4 and which
is in harmony with the Texas decision.
B. Where Domicile is Changed to Common Law State
Undoubtedly, the spouses may sever their community interests
after the change of domicile through the use of mutual gifts
since this is permitted by all the community states. 14 9 Neither
will this contravene any public policy of the common law jurisdictions. Of course, the mere fact that the severance can thus be
effected does not insure that this is at all desirable. On the
contrary, it may result in the levying of taxes which might otherwise be avoided, 1"" and alternate methods of transmutation may
be preferrable.
One such alternative is a partition through the medium of a
joint agreement, i.e., a severance by contract and not by gift or
exchange. The attorney in the common law state will, therefore,
have to resort to the law of his state, including its conflict of
laws rules, to determine if such a severance can be consummated
there, and if so, with what formalities. This raises two questions
147. In addition to the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Desmond, see note

66 COLUm. L. Rav. 790 (1966).

148. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918) and the cases cited
therein.
149. Lightning Delivery Co. v. Matteson, 45 Ariz. 92, 39 P.2d 938 (1935);
Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949) ; Hobbs v. Hobbs, 69
Idaho 201, 204 P.2d 1034 (1949) ; Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579
(1945); Shroff v. Deaton, 220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Scott v.
Currie, 7 Wash. 2d 301, 109 P.2d 526 (1941); LA. Crv. CODE A N. art. 1746;
N.M. STAT. Aim. §§ 57-3-4, 57-3-5 (1953).
150. These unwanted taxes could be either federal or state gift taxes. INT.
RrV. CODE of 1954, § 2501. Also, if the spouses make mutual gifts by which
each then receives in return the share of the other, it might be possible to
construe this as an actual "sale or exchange" and, as such, subject to income
taxation. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1002.
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which must be resolved before he can proceed. May the parties
sever their community property by joint agreement although
such action is forbidden by the community state where the property was acquired? If both states permit a severance, which law
governs the method and the formalities required?
1. ReaZ Property
If the migrant clients own real estate in the community property state, there can be no doubt but that the law of that jurisdiction should determine their ability to partition their community interests therein. The method by which this may be accomplished will likewise be governed by the law of the situs. The
universal rule is that the validity of a transfer of real estate is
determined by the law of the state within whose boundaries the
property is situated. 151 The Restatement of Conflicts also takes
the position that the validity of a conveyance of an interest in
land, the capacity to make such a conveyance, the requisite formalities of the conveyance and the effect thereof, are all deter152
mined by the law of the situs.
In the instance of realty located in a community state where
the spouses may freely contract with each other, or may make
conveyances of real property between themselves, no formidable
problems are presented.1 53 The attorney may engage the services
of a corresponding attorney in the community state to prepare
the requisite conveyancing instruments. They may be executed by
the spouses at their domicile and returned to the community
property state for proper recordation.
151. United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876) ; Sunderland v. United States,

266 U.S. 226 (1924); Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 83 F.2d
168 (2nd Cir. 1936). See also, LEFLAR, CoNrucrs OF LAWS §§ 140, 143, 144

(1959). The only possible exception to this well established rule is where the

parties are all before the court and it is necessary to decide some question
relating to realty located elsewhere to insure a final disposition of the case.

In this situation courts have, on occasion, required the parties to execute a
conveyance to foreign realty. This is done upon the assumption that the court
order operates upon the persons and is not a direct action affecting title to
real estate. See e.g., Tischhauser v. Tischhouser, 142 Cal. App. 2d 252, 298
P.2d 551 (1956). However, as pointed out above, this is given validity where
the parties are involved in a court action. It has no application to the ordinary
estate planning scheme where the spouses are trying to make a voluntary con-

veyance or severance. The law of the situs would govern.
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND),

CONFLIcr OF LAWS §§ 219, 221 (Tent. Draft

No. 5, 1959).
153. Included in this group are: Arizona, Axiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-214
(1956); California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 158; Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906
(1963); Nevada, NEv. Rxv. STAT. §§ 123.070, 123.080(1)

(1957); New Mexico,

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-2-6, 57-2-12 (1953); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.16.050 (1951).
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Additional problems are created, however, in Louisiana and
Texas where there are certain limitations upon the ability to
partition the community property. In Louisiana, spouses who
have entered into the marital relationship without the benefit of
an ante-nuptial contract covering the method of acquiring property are, by statute, barred from subsequently dissolving or severing their community by a consensual arrangement. 154 This
definitely goes to the capacity of the parties to make a valid
conveyance of title to realty and, as such, is governed by the law
of the situs, that is, the law of Louisiana. 155 Hence, the migrant
spouses may not partition their community realty by a joint
agreement even though they no longer reside in Louisiana.
Such a contract would have to be recognized in Louisiana to be
effective.
The only voluntary method of dissolution permitted in Louisiana is by gift, 15 6 and even then the spouses cannot make reciprocal gifts involving the same property. 157 Thus, two gifts would
be required. The first would involve the interest of one spouse in
the community property being given to the other at which time
the donee spouse would own all of it as separate property. The
second gift would then be consummated when one-half of this
property was returned to the former donor. Each spouse then
would own one-half of the property as a part of his separate
estate. By the use of this approach, two completed gifts have
been effected, thus resulting in a possible taxation on both of
them. This should not be interpreted to mean that the gift route
should never be utilized since it may be the only available one,
but the consequences should be recognized.
A voluntary severance in Texas is limited in two instances.
The partition must be contained in a written instrument subscribed and acknowledged by both spouses in the same manner
required for the conveyance of realty. 5 s When the property is
Texas realty, there are no insoluable problems. The corresponding attorney is again the answer. Secondly, if the instrument
purports to partition the property other than as equal interests in the same assets, it must be approved by the district
154. LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art. 2329.
155. rSTATEATENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 216 (Tent. Draft No. 5,

1959).

156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 1746.
157. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 1751.
158. TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4624a (Vernon 1948).
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court of the county wherein the realty is situated. 15 9 Any attempted severance or conveyance without a compliance with this
procedure would be invalid inasmuch as it relates to the formalities of a conveyance. 10 While the court's approval is indispensable for a transmutation into separate property or into a
tenancy in common, it is apparently unnecessary for the creation
of a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship where the
agreement is reduced to writing.'"" The parties may avail themselves of this recent enactment if the joint tenancy is compatible
with the overall result sought to be achieved by their estate
plans.
Hence, there seems to be little difficulty in the spouses effectively partitioning their community interests in foreign realty
although they must comply with the law of the situs. The only
exception to this rule is real estate situated in Louisiana.
By the same rule, if the parties purchase real property in the
common law state after their change of domicile, the interests
acquired therein should be determined by the law of that state. 162
If they agree that it is to be held by them in some common law
form of ownership, or if they agree to partition it in any fashion,
the law of the situs will be determinative of this ability irrespective of where the purchase funds were accumulated. This should
not in any way be interpreted to mean that the community characteristics of the purchase funds have been altered or destroyed
by the change of domicile. The transmutation would be effective
as a result of the consensual arrangement between the spouses
and not because of the interstate move.
2. PersonaZ Property
In addition to their realty the spouses will undoubtedly have
some personal property. This may be the actual property acquired in, and brought from, the community state, or it may have
been subsequently received in exchange for such community property. Furthermore, the personalty may be either tangible or intangible, the latter of which may or may not be represented by
or embodied in an instrument or document of title.
159. TEx. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4624a (Vernon 1948).
160. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 217 (Tent. Draft No. 5,

1959).
161. Supra notes 109, 113.
162.

REsTAT MENT (SEcowm),

ComuLIcr OF LAws

No. 5, 1959).
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a. TangibZe Personalty. The question of whether the spouses
may voluntarily sever their community interests in tangible personalty may be categorized as one of property or as one of contracts. If classified as one of property, the general rule is that
an inter vivos conveyance of an interest in tangibles is governed
by the law of the situs of the property. 163 A few older cases rely
on the law of the owner's domicile, because it is directly related
to the time worn adage that personalty has no situs other than
the owner's domicile. 16 4 This has presently fallen into disuse
where the transfer is an inter vivos one.'
Under either rule, the
law of the common law jurisdiction would be applicable since
both the situs of the property and the domicile of the spouses
are in that state.
The Restatement of Conflicts has taken a similar position. The
capacity of the parties to make such a conveyance, together with
the requisite formalities thereof and the interests obtained thereby, are all governed by the law of the state where the property
is located at the time of the conveyance. 66
Even if the problem is characterized as one of contract and
not property, the same result should follow. There are three
primary conflicts rules regarding the validity of a contract.
The choice will be the law of the state where it is executed, the
law of the place where it is to be performed, or the law of the
state which the contracting parties intend to be controlling. The
latter choice presumes that their intention is to have the validity
governed by the law of a jurisdiction that has a substantial connection with the contract.10 7 Under any of these choices, the partitioning contract would be governed by the law of the new
domicile inasmuch as the contract will be executed there; it will
be performed in that state and the parties will obviously desire
the application of that law if it aids them in the accomplishment
of their severance.
163. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 153 (3rd ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CoNFLIcr
OF LAWS §§ 150, 154 (1959).
164. For some of the older cases adhering to this view, see Loftus v. Farmers
& Mech. Nat'l Bank, 133 Pa. 97, 19 Ati. 347 (1890) ; Whitney v. Dodge, 105
Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (1894).
165. For a case criticizing the use of this rule, see Lees v. Harding, Whitman & Co., 68 NJ. Eq. 622, 60 AtI. 352 (1905).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 254b-58 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1959).
167. See generally, GooDRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 108-10 (3rd ed. 1949);
LrFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122, 123 (1959).
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A fourth and more recent approach to the ascertainment of
the validity of a contract is the so-called "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" theory. Under this approach the law of
the state which has the most significant contacts with the contract will govern its validity and effect. 1 8 Again, the law of the
common law state would govern since every aspect of the contract occurs there. The only event that took place elsewhere was
the original acquisition of the community property. A position
very similar to the grouping of contacts has been expostulated
by the Restatement of Conflicts. It specifies that the validity
of a contract is to be determined by the law of the state with
which it has its most significant relationship. 169 This state is
defined as the one chosen by the parties to govern unless (1)
such state was selected by one party by unfair means or was the
result of a mistake, (2) the contract has no substantial contacts
with the chosen state, or (3) the application of such law would
be contrary to the public policy of the state whose law would
have governed in the absence of the parties' specification of a
particular state. 170 If the parties do not select a state and if both
the place of contracting and the place of performance are in the
same jurisdiction, its law will determine the validity of the
contract under the Restatement approach. 17 1
Therefore, whether the problem is characterized as one of
contract or one of property, or some combination thereof, the
law of the common law state would or could be used to govern the
partitioning of the community interests in tangible personalty
under either the Restatement viewpoint or the general conflicts
rules as expressed by the cases.
b. Intangible Personalty. The type of property with which the
spouses will probably be the most concerned is their intangible
personalty including their stocks and bonds. This will ordinarily
encompass a major share of their assets and the rules relating
thereto should be considered. The determination of the applicable
law presents a different problem from that involved in the case
168. LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 125 (1959). The first case to adopt this
theory was W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).

See also Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), which is perhaps the leading case in this area.
169. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm), CONFLICT OF LAwS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6,

1960).

170. RFSTATEMENT (SEcom,), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332a (Tent. Draft No. 6,

1960).
171. RFSTATEMENT

(SEcoNz),

CONnLICT OF LAWS § 332b (Tent. Draft No. 6,

1960).
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of real property or tangible personalty. In each of these latter
cases, the property has an actual physical situs. On the other
hand, intangibles do not usually have such a situs, making more
difficult a determination of what law controls the transfer of an
interest in such property.
One of the more common forms of intangible personalty is
shares of corporate stock. This is property which is said to be
represented by or embodied in an instrument, i.e., the share is
represented by the certificate. The courts have taken the position
that the state in which the corporation was organized or incorporated has complete jurisdiction over the shares even though
the stock certificates are located elsewhere. 172 Thus, the law of
the state of incorporation alone is determinative of how a transfer
173
of the share of stock may be effectuated.
This has been resolved by the promulgation of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, one of the primary purposes of which is to
make the stock certificate, as far as possible, the sole representative for the share or shares for which it stands. 17 4 Under this
act, which has now been adopted in some form by all fifty
states, 71 1 title to the stock certificates, and to the shares represented thereby, may be transferred "by delivery of the certificate
endorsed either in blank or to a specified person by the person
appearing by the certificate to be the owner."' 76 By complying
with this requirement, the parties, as between themselves, would
be able to change the method of holding the stock from community to one that is compatible with their estate plan. As between
the spouses and the corporation, the original stock certificates
should be returned to the corporation for the purpose of having
it reissue them in the manner now desired.
The validity of the transfer of any other intangible property
interest embodied in an instrument is dependent upon the law of
the place where the document is located at the time of the con172. Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939); Petri v. Rhein, 162

F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ill. 1957). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 182 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
173. Petri v. Rhein, supra note 172; Mills v. Jacobs, supra note 172. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 182 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
174, Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939).
175. See, 6 U.L.A. at 7-10 (Supp. 1963) for the state citations and the manner in which their adoption has varied from the Uniform Act, if it has in any
respect.

176. 6 U.L.A. § 1 (Supp. 1965).
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veyance.177 Hence, if the parties are domiciled in the common
law state and the instrument is situated there, the law of that
jurisdiction should govern when the spouses, by mutual agreement, attempt to sever or partition their community interests.
If the spouses should have an intangible interest, such as an
account receivable that is not embodied in, nor represented by,
an instrument, the law of the place where the transfer occurs
will be controlling.' 7 8 This is based upon the theory that the
transfer is in reality an assignment, and the same rules regarding
the validity of an assignment are usually applicable. 1'7 9 Again,
the law of the spouses' domicile, where the transfer takes place,
is determinative. While these rules may have importance in occasional situations, the estate of most mobile clients will ordinarily contain very little of these intangibles, or at least not
enough to significantly affect their estate plans.
III. SUMMARY
The above conflicts rules are the ones most generally accepted
and most frequently applied by the courts, but it cannot be said
that any one of them is "the" rule insofar as concerns a severance of community property where the spouses have changed
their domicile to a common law jurisdiction. The precise issue
has never been resolved by the courts. Nevertheless, they are
the ones that have been used in deciding questions which involved
similar interstate transactions.
There seems to be no valid reason why the court in the common law state could not use its own law in ascertaining the
ability of the spouses to partition their community interests in
any personal property when the parties are domiciled there; when
it has jurisdiction over the particular property involved; when
all of the events concerning the severance transpired within its
boundaries; and, when the parties expressly request that the law
of their domicile be determinative. This is particularly true in
light of the New York decision in Wyatt v. Fulrath, 0 which
applied forum law even though the parties had never changed
their domicile. In fact, it may be argued that no conflicts probOF LAWS §§ 160-63 (3d ed. 1949).
CONFUCr OF LAWS § 262 (Tent. Draft No.

177. See generally, GooDRIcH, CoNFmcT
See also RESTATEmENT (SEcoN),

5, 1959).

178. Callwood v. Virgin Islands Natl Bank, 221 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1955);
Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 118 N.W2d 85 (1962).
179. GOODRICH, CoNFict OF LAWS §§ 160-63 (3d ed. 1949).

180. 16 N.Y.2d 169, 264 N.Y.S2d 233, 211 N.E2d 637 (1965).
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lem is even existent under these peculiar facts. After all, the
only contact with any other state was the acquisition of the
original community property while the spouses were domiciled
there, and they now are perfectly willing to have their interests
determined by the common law state. However, the fact that the
property was acquired while domiciled elsewhere may be enough
to induce the court to look to the law of the community jurisdiction in order to determine whether their marital property
rights may be altered. While the wisdom of this approach may be
questioned where the parties are contracting with respect to their
property rights, this possibility does exist and should be recognized. The attorney should consider it to thwart a blatant error
on his part.
The best approach for the attorney is to have the partitioning
contract meet the requirements of both states if at all possible.
If the spouses are from a community state such as California
where they may freely sever their community interests, 8 1 this
may be accomplished with little difficulty. On the other hand,
if they are from Louisiana where all post-marital severances are
prohibited in the absence of an ante-nuptial contract, 82 this will
be impossible. Total reliance and dependence upon the domiciliary law will then be necessitated. The statutes or case law of
the common law jurisdiction will naturally contain no specific information concerning the requisite formalities for a severance of
community property, but the rules governing either a sale or a
88
contract for the sale of personal property will be determinative.
A second advantage to be gained from a compliance with the
law of the community state, in addition to compliance with that
of the common law state, whenever possible is from the standpoint of proof of intention of the parties. Someone might subsequently challenge the validity of the severance, not on the theory
that the law of the domicile is not controlling, but upon the basis
that one spouse has perpetrated a fraud upon the other inasmuch as he or she was ignorant of the fact that the contract
executed in the common law state produced a transmutation of
his or her community interest. If the community state's rules of
severance are adherred to, this will lend credence to the idea
that a partition was actually intended and desired.
181. See text, § I(B) supra.
182. See text, § I(D) supra.
183. See text, § II(B) (2) (b) supra.
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A very important aspect of any partitioning agreement is its
reduction to writing even though this may not always be essential
to its validity. 8 4 While a writing might not forestall any litigation over the ability of the parties to partition, their intention
will be well documented. Later guesswork about latent intention
and fraudulent designs will be held to a minimum.
Again, it should be reiterated that since the decision in Free v.
Bland,185 the spouses may destroy the community aspects of their
property, irrespective of the laws of either state, by investing it
in United States Savings Bonds and taking title as co-owners.
The feasibility of such a move poses another question from the
estate planning viewpoint.
In short, many problems abound in this area which have never
been decided by a court nor remedied by a legislature in the
various common law states. The attorney will have to exhibit
considerable ingenuity in formulating an estate plan for his mobile clients, always keeping in mind the possibility that a court
sitting in a common law state may or may not recognize the community character of the property. Partitioning agreements should
be considered so that the estate will contain no community property to plague the court.

184. See Erhman, InsIant Community Property, 40 CAL. S.BJ. 259 (1965).

185. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
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